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Abstract 
The categorical denial of third-party forgiveness represents an overly 
individualistic approach to moral repair. Such an approach fails to 
acknowledge the important roles played by witnesses, bystanders, 
beneficiaries, and others who stand in solidarity to the primary victim and 
perpetrator. In this paper, I argue that the prerogative to forgive or withhold 
forgiveness is not universal, but neither is it restricted to victims alone. Not 
only can we make moral sense of some third-party acts and utterances of the 
form, “I can or cannot forgive…” but also, we ought to recognize them as 
legitimate instances of third party forgiveness. Concern for the primary 
victim’s autonomy tends to exaggerate a need for moral deference, while 
ignoring how others are called upon to support and mediate for victims of 
violence and oppression. I advocate a cautious extension of the victim’s 
prerogative to forgive, one that grounds forgiveness in a double relation of 
sympathetic identification and attentive care. Following Jean Harvey’s recent 
work, I call this relationship moral solidarity. Furthermore, I argue, there are 
important moral and political reasons to acknowledge third party forgiveness; 
these reasons are particularly evident in contexts of oppression. In fact, third 
party refusals to forgive may have particular moral significance. In situations 
of abuse, oppression and damaged self-respect, third party refusals may 
protect the agency of victims who too easily forgive.  
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1.  Introduction 
Consider two very different views of who can forgive. According to 
the first, the ability to forgive wrongdoings is universal. Forgiveness is, 
among other things, an act of moral reappraisal: a wrongdoer either ought, or 
ought not, to be forgiven. Anyone who is capable of making the correct 
judgment that X should be forgiven is therefore capable of forgiving X, 
whether or not she had any previous relationship to X’s wrongdoing.1 The 
second, and far more popular, view is best expressed in John Dryden’s 
famous quotation: “forgiveness to the injured doth belong.…”2 In other 
words, only the direct victim of a particular wrong is in a position to forgive 
it.3 The prerogative is hers and hers alone. Ignoring her prerogative, 
advocates of the second position argue, risks appropriating and even silencing 
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the victim’s voice. In this view, third-party efforts to forgive involve, at best, 
a dangerous paternalism; at worst, they are morally or logically incoherent. 
In this paper, I want to chart a middle ground between these two 
views. The prerogative to forgive is not universal, I argue, but neither is it 
restricted to direct victims of harm. Instead, we can understand at least some 
third-party efforts to forgive as morally legitimate, insofar as they are 
grounded in a relationship I describe as moral solidarity.4 My argument takes 
the following form: first, I reject arguments against third-party forgiveness. 
In doing so, I also consider reasons for third-party forgiveness, that is, 
reasons why potential acts of third-party forgiveness are morally important. 
These reasons include a more accurate understanding of the relational nature 
of harm and moral repair, the need for third-party forgiveness or self-
forgiveness when victims are absent, incapacitated or particularly 
recalcitrant, and - perhaps most significantly - the role of third-party refusals 
to forgive, when victims are coerced by abuse, oppression and damaged self-
respect. In the second part of my argument, I turn from the possibility of 
third-party forgiveness to the relation in which it is grounded. I suggest this is 
not correct moral judgment or even care alone, but the particular deferent, 
‘caring attentiveness’ that Jean Harvey calls moral solidarity.5 I conclude by 
mentioning some risks and rewards of third-party forgiveness. 
Throughout my discussion, I refer to a ‘prerogative’ to forgive. 
Prerogative, at least as used in the philosophical literature on forgiveness, is a 
normative concept: an ability in virtue of some authority or authorization. 
Having a moral prerogative to forgive does not entail that all subsequent 
exercises of it are morally good - and some prerogatives are more risky than 
others - but it does create a normative space in which they are potentially 
good. There are, no doubt, many arrogant, inappropriate or morally 
insensitive instances of third-party forgiveness, but acknowledging the 
possibility of legitimate third-party forgiveness gives us a finer tool for their 
critique. 
 
2.  Arguments for and against Third-Party Forgiveness 
Arguments against third-party forgiveness are plentiful in the 
philosophical literature.6 For the most part, they take one of two forms: either 
critics argue that third parties ‘go wrong’ in some way whenever they attempt 
to forgive or they suggest that third parties may well be doing something 
morally valuable, but their morally valuable act does not count as third-party 
forgiveness, per se. I call the latter ‘debunking’ approaches, as they attempt to 
explain away supposed acts of third-party forgiveness as acts of moral 
imagination or uses of figurative language, on the one hand, or variations of 
victim’s forgiveness on the other. I begin by considering direct attacks on 
acts of third-party forgiveness, in themselves. 
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Few philosophers see the victim’s sole prerogative as a logical claim 
or a matter of definition: as “only the president can issue a pardon” might 
delineate a restricted performative power, for example.7 That we can 
understand third-party forgiveness as morally problematic suggests, at the 
very least, that would-be third-party forgivers are aspiring to something 
minimally coherent. Instead, the victims-only argument usually takes the 
form of a moral claim: there is something disrespectful, even unfair, they 
argue, when third parties appropriate something that belongs to the victim.8 I 
call this the argument from moral deference.9 In its strongest form, it suggests 
that third-party forgiveness negates the moral agency of the victim. 
I am sympathetic to the sentiment behind this critique. The intuition 
that victims require respect, and that the victim’s experience of the 
wrongdoing ought somehow to be central to any act of forgiveness, is not 
misguided. As Martha Minow remarks, “restoring dignity to victims… 
should at a minimum involve respecting their own responses,” even if we do 
not, in the end, agree with them.10 Yet it is not clear that attentiveness to 
victims’ experiences, credence to victims’ voices and acknowledgment of 
their suffering add up to an exclusive entitlement to forgive: a priority, 
perhaps, but not necessarily the only prerogative.11 The victim’s subject 
position does not guarantee the kind of exclusive authority that many writing 
on forgiveness have assumed it does - nor is it necessarily in the victim’s best 
interest that it do so. There may be victim-centred reasons to advocate for 
third-party forgiveness. 
Harvey makes a very strong version of this claim, in discussing 
victims of systemic oppression: “there is nothing in fact that places the 
victims in an ‘authoritative’ role as distinct from a morally central role.”12 
This is, perhaps, a difficult thing to hear, particularly when victims are those 
whose voices are not typically heard or recognized in the first place. Note 
that Harvey is not suggesting we discount or ignore the victim’s standpoint, 
only that we remain open to the possibility of reflective critique. While the 
victim’s experience may be the central and defining feature of appropriate 
reasons to forgive, it is not always the case that the victim’s own recounting 
of that experience must be the authoritative version, or that only she can have 
access to the kind of experience sufficient for forgiveness. The danger here 
lies in conflating correlation with philosophical necessity. We tend to pay 
careful attention to our own slights and harms, to recount our injuries in 
greater detail, and to draw deeper conclusions about their consequences.13 
But serious victimization is a brutal and damaging process: among other 
harmful consequences, it can even damage the victim’s character, that is, her 
dispositions to react appropriately to the world around her. The victim may 
have a ‘special relationship’ to the wrong, in light of actually having 
undergone the experience, but this relationship may be as epistemologically 
problematic as it is advantageous. 
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The most stringent objection to third-party forgiveness (that it 
negates the victim’s agency) assumes the question really arises only when the 
victim herself refuses to forgive. This construes the moral work of 
forgiveness too narrowly: more forgiveness beyond the victim’s own is not 
necessarily redundant. There are cases in which a third party may be called 
upon to reinforce the victim’s own decision. Even if the victim has not 
forgiven, or perhaps is not able to forgive, a third-party decision to forgive is 
not necessarily a presumption or a command for the victim to do the same. 
The third party may see her forgiveness as a partial contribution in the 
absence of the victim’s forgiveness, and may communicate it as such to both 
the victim and wrongdoer; in doing so, she may offer relief simultaneously to 
a repentant, remorseful wrongdoer and a wounded, vulnerable victim. That a 
third party is, in certain cases, able to lift some of the burden of wrongdoing 
may be particularly relevant when the victim is no longer capable of doing 
so, e.g., when she is absent, incapacitated or even dead.14 Of course, in these 
cases, interested third parties may have particular reasons to respect, and 
resent, the victim’s suffering (and thus refuse to forgive) but - equally - may 
be invested in respecting the victim’s wishes, where these entail forgiving 
when she can no longer do so. Insisting on a strict victim’s prerogative would 
have the peculiar consequence of rendering every infraction - however minor 
- against a (now) deceased, incapacitated, or even a particularly stern victim 
thereby unforgivable.15 
Furthermore, respect for another person does not always entail 
complying with her wishes or even remaining silent about them. Sometimes, 
respect for another’s moral agency means communicating when and where 
she has gone wrong, and even attempting to provide a different or better 
example of moral action. While Claudia Card is right to acknowledge that 
victimization may introduce particular moral powers, these ‘powers’ do not 
render the victim immune to moral judgment.16 We can all recognize bad 
decisions to forgive and equally, unreasonable or cruel decisions to withhold 
forgiveness. We can even make inferences of good or bad character from 
those decisions. Finally, insisting on the need for ‘moral deference’ to the 
victim of wrongdoing, at all costs, risks over-moralizing the victim’s 
position.17 We may forgive agents for particular acts they have committed 
against us, but in many cases, isolated incidents of wrongdoing take place in 
the context of an ongoing interpersonal relationship, which in turn takes place 
against a broader background of social and political power dynamics. In very 
few of such complicated scenarios are the parties involved easily identified as 
‘victim’ or ‘wrongdoer’ simpliciter. As a result, there are often cases where 
the ‘victim’ of a discrete wrong is more dangerous to the wrongdoer than vice 
versa.18 Forgiveness has multiple functions in the aftermath of wrongdoing, 
and so can be a good - something sought by either party, and with good 
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reason - even when further relations (even the minimal contact needed to 
communicate or instantiate forgiveness) between them is not a good idea. 
In ignoring the multiple roles played by forgiveness (both by victims 
and third parties), the philosophical literature has tended to advocate what 
Sharon Lamb calls “a hyperindividualized notion of personal harm.”19 
Griswold suggests that this picture is a matter of ‘common-sense’ moral 
individualism.20 But, as Lamb notes, such an approach ignores the role of 
group identities and identifications in situations of trauma and harms - nor 
does it reflect the often fragmented and multiple nature of our identities, nor 
the ways in which we are always selves-in-relation to one another.21 While it 
may be conceptually tidy to describe scenarios of forgiveness as singular, 
isolated incidents, complete with a single, easily identifiable (and morally 
uncomplicated) ‘victim’ and ‘wrongdoer’, these paradigms bear very little 
resemblance to most actual situations in which we are called upon to forgive 
or be forgiven. If we treat ‘hyperindividualized’ paradigms as normative 
frameworks for evaluating our more complicated moral experiences, we risk 
distorting the particularities of our moral reality.22  
At the beginning of this section, I mentioned two forms of argument 
against third-party forgiveness. The victims-only objection directly criticizes 
attempts by third parties to intervene. ‘Debunking’ accounts, on the other 
hand, recognize that those beside the direct victim and perpetrator may well 
contribute to moral repair but resist the thought that third parties are 
forgiving. Some suggest that utterances such as “I can’t possibly forgive X 
for what she did to Y” are actually figurative uses of forgiveness language; 
no one is actually refusing X forgiveness. The speaker (Z) is using 
‘unforgivable’ as a measure of X’s wrongfulness or indicating that if she 
were in Y’s place, she would not forgive. Her own forgiveness does not enter 
into the question. 
It’s true; we do engage in imaginative speculation regarding the 
harms of others, and we do use ‘unforgivable’ as shorthand for ‘heinous’, 
‘awful’, ‘evil’ etc. But not all instances of third party forgiveness can be 
assimilated to this model; if they could, we would be unable to explain why 
inappropriate acts of third-party forgiveness seem to matter, why third parties 
are sometimes called upon (by the victim or perpetrator) to forgive, or why I 
seem even less qualified to forgive an atrocity to which I have no connection 
than someone who deeply identifies with (or cares for) the victims. My lack 
of prerogative is not, among other things, a failure to employ figures of 
speech appropriately. 
Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd have suggested that 
recognizing ‘multiple’ victims of wrongdoing is a better approach than 
allowing for third-party forgiveness. In doing so, they avoid the 
‘hyperindividualized’ approach of many writing on forgiveness, and I 
appreciate the handiness of their model. Yet there are many cases in which a 
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more flexible and shifting measurement of one’s relationship to the injury is 
required than a strict primary/secondary/tertiary division will allow. 
Furthermore, it mistakes the object of a third-party’s concern; insofar as she 
forgives as a third party, it is not her own distress that motivates her but her 
appreciation of someone else’s - even if she can also, rightly, claim distress 
as a secondary (or tertiary) victim. Equating the two, a Norlock notes, 
commits a version of the psychological egoist fallacy: I may be the subject of 
distress without being the object of it.23 Finally, third parties may involve 
themselves in the question of forgiveness through their proximity to the 
wrongdoer - even if they subsequently come to empathize with the victim’s 
suffering. 
 
3.  Third-Party Forgiveness and Moral Solidarity 
Implicit in my account is the claim that we forgive for reasons, and 
while these reasons draw on intimate aspects of the victim’s experience, not 
only the victim has access to them, necessarily. Others may discover such 
reasons through attentive, empathetic engagement. Does that mean that 
anyone at all who gets the decision to forgive ‘right’ is thereby engaging in 
morally legitimate forgiveness? Not exactly - my extension of the prerogative 
to forgive is more cautious than that. Forgiveness remains a personal reaction 
to harm; to forgive is, in some sense, to claim that I take the wrongdoing 
personally. Clearly there is at least one person other than the victim who has 
reason to take the wrongdoing personally: the wrongdoer.24 Indeed, I think 
we are often more critical of our own wrongdoing not because we hold 
ourselves to a higher standard, but because it rankles personally in a way that 
the failures of others do not: my misdeed is mine and I must live with it. I 
have good reason to take it personally and to be personally invested in how it 
is taken up, redressed and remembered. If the wrongdoer has good reason to 
take it personally, then legitimately “taking it personally” is not the same as 
“having been victimized.” Our prerogative to forgive, I would argue, emerges 
from how we behave in light of the former (personal involvement) and not 
the latter (victimization). 
So what gives third parties the right to take a wrongdoing 
personally? Creating a typology of appropriate reasons is a daunting and 
unwieldy process. Instead, I think we would do well to note how third parties 
are ‘called upon’ or ‘drawn in’ - either literally, by one of the primary 
figures, or in light of their own commitments, identification and care, for 
those involved. The figurative and the multiple victims account both get 
something right: it seems that some of us (those close to the victim, or 
wrongdoer) are better placed to assume a forgiver’s prerogative and, at the 
same time, some imaginative effort must be involved, even for these. In other 
words, it is not enough simply to care for the victim (to stand in a particular 
relationship to her) or enough to ‘get it right’ regarding the decision to 
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forgive.25 Instead, both conditions must ground the legitimacy of third party 
efforts. A potential forgiver must be committed to the interests of the victim 
(that is, getting it right) while, at the same time, must demonstrate some 
deference to her understanding of those interests even if this understanding 
diverges from the forgiver’s own. This commitment is more likely - though 
not guaranteed - to emerge in relationships of personal or political solidarity. 
If the forgiver is no longer able to communicate or understand her own 
interests then, as Griswold describes, third parties are called upon to begin 
the long - and possibly open-ended task - of imaginatively reconstructing 
what these might have been.26 
Thus a third party prerogative is doubly grounded: first, in a prior 
relationship of identification with or care for the victim or wrongdoer, and 
second, in a careful and attentive empathetic engagement with the victim’s 
experience of having been wronged. The latter condition very much 
resembles Harvey’s account of moral solidarity: a personal, “caring 
attentiveness” owed to victims and their experiences, which differs - 
significantly - from automatic deference to their personal accounts of that 
experience.27 Moral solidarity means not just aligning myself with the victim 
and her interests, but to view those interests in light of my best imaginative 
reconstruction of her voice and experience while acknowledging that such 
efforts are, at best, asymptotic and in need of constant reassessment and 
readjustment. 
It seems to me that third parties who stand in a relation of moral 
solidarity to victims of wrongdoing are rightly granted a prerogative to 
forgive.28 Many examples of moral solidarity are found in intimate 
relationships of care: friendship and family ties. Friends and family may be 
best placed to listen and gauge appropriate reactions. But I believe that 
Harvey’s notion, applied to the question of forgiveness, can be equally 
fruitful when considering allegiances formed through shared social and 
political identifications: that is, when those involved share social or group 
identities, especially when these identities are partly responsible for making 
the victim more vulnerable to harm. I think here of members of minorities, 
those who have been affected or have witnessed hate crimes, or bystanders to 
particular kinds of social exclusion and violence. Indeed, relations of moral 
solidarity may be built through common experience; perhaps those victimized 
by similar crimes are most able to form the appropriate kinds of sympathetic 
attention. Lamb explores solidarity among female survivors of sexual (and 
other violence) and suggests that often, decisions to forgive - or, equally 
important, to refuse forgiveness - are appropriately grounded in a sense of 
solidarity with others in the same situation.29  
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4.  Conclusions: Risks and Rewards of Third-Party Forgiveness 
Third party prerogatives to forgive ought to be exercised with 
significant caution, as there are greater risks associated with them. While I 
have tried to suggest that we can meaningfully account for third-party 
forgiveness as forgiveness without making it a substitute for victims’ 
forgiveness, there is still a real danger that the initiative to forgive, when 
taken by others, will feel like such to the victim. Here, a balance needs to be 
struck between the need for attentiveness to the victim’s voice and the danger 
of being held hostage to it. Clearly there are times when victims have good 
reason to forgive and yet they do not, and certain third parties may recognize 
some of those reasons. The question instead is: How do we cope with the 
danger of stepping in too readily, or in such a way as to violate or disrespect 
the primary victim of wrong? Obviously there is no easy solution here, but 
one helpful approach may be the careful consideration of the relative power 
positions of those involved: in particular, the comparative social position of 
the victim and the third party and the amount of institutional or political 
power each may have individually or as members of a group. Thus, 
individuals from dominant social groups may need to be more deferent 
towards the responses of victims who are from oppressed or marginalized 
groups. Moral solidarity, as I have described it, may curb our initial moral 
deference; it ought not, however, replace it.30 
In certain situations, I have argued, third party forgiveness can play 
a valuable supplementary role to the primary victim’s own forgiveness and 
may have a corrective or compensatory function in its absence. There are 
moral risks associated with even the most well-meaning efforts to third-party 
forgive, however, and for this reason I suggest that morally legitimate 
instances will always be grounded in a robust form of moral solidarity: a 
double relationship of sympathetic identification with, and attentive care 
toward, the primary victim of wrong. Where there is a significant power 
imbalance between victim and third-party, moral solidarity may take a back 
seat to moral deference.  
There is an asymmetry, however, between this kind of discrepancy 
in forgiving reactions and the opposite: that is, when the victim forgives but 
third parties recognize legitimate reasons to withhold forgiveness or 
problematic aspects of the victim’s own decision to grant it. While third-party 
forgiveness cannot substitute for victim’s forgiveness, the victim’s decision 
to forgive does not necessarily eliminate the third party’s need to make a 
similar moral choice, either, or entail that third parties will also choose to 
forgive. Again, this is particularly true when we consider individual acts of 
forgiveness in the broader context of social injustice. Moral solidarity, like its 
political analogue, becomes particularly relevant. Moreover, in this case, the 
most respectful thing that others who identify with the victim may be able to 
do is meaningfully to withhold their forgiveness and to continue to hold the 
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wrongdoer accountable in ways that the victim is not be able to do. In fact, 
one of the most important reasons we have to recognize the possibility of 
third-party forgiveness is that this recognition allows, equally, for the 
possibility of its refusal. Third-party refusals to forgive may be important 
expressions of solidarity and moral community, whose value can only be 
wholly accounted for when we acknowledge that the power to forgive is not 
limited to immediate victims of wrongdoing.  
 
Notes 
 
1 I am grateful to David White for introducing and defending this position to 
me, very convincingly, in conversation. Note that ‘X ought to be forgiven’ 
does not entail that a particular wrongdoer either deserves or does not deserve 
to be forgiven. The statement remains neutral with regard to the kinds of 
reasons for which we might forgive. Restricting reasons to forgive to the 
wrongdoer’s desert risks creating ‘paradoxes’ of forgiveness, such as that 
famously articulated by Aurel Kolnai, who noted that, if a matter of the 
wrongdoer’s desert, forgiveness was in danger of being “either unjustified or 
pointless.” A Kolnai, ‘Forgiveness,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
vol. 74, 1973, pp. 91-106.  
2 Taken from “The Conquest of Granada.” Few who cite Dryden comment on 
the rather pessimistic tone of the following line: “…but they ne’er pardon 
who have done the wrong.” 
3 For example, Berel Lang argues that “only the person who suffers the 
harm… is in a position to grant or refuse” a request for forgiveness. Piers 
Benn discusses forgiveness as an ‘entitlement’ analogous to waiving a debt, 
while H. J. N. Horsbrugh claims that even the verb ‘to forgive’ takes into 
account whether one has oneself sustained a serious injury. Jeffrie Murphy 
and Joram Haber also agree with Dryden’s quotation. See B Lang, 
‘Forgiveness,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 1994, pp. 
107; P Benn, ‘Forgiveness and Loyalty’ Philosophy, vol. 71, 1996, pp. 369-
83; H J N Horsbrugh, ‘Forgiveness,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 4, 
1974, pp. 269-82; J G Murphy and J Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; J G Haber, Forgiveness: A 
Philosophical Study, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1991. 
4 In using the term ‘moral solidarity,’ I draw on recent work by Jean Harvey; 
see J Harvey, ‘Moral Solidarity and Empathetic Understanding: The Moral 
Value and Scope of the Relationship,’ Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 38, 
no. 1, 2007, pp. 22-37. 
5 ibid., p. 30.  
6 Indeed, opinion on this topic is so close to uniform that the exceptions are 
worth mentioning. Kathryn Norlock argues forcefully against assimilating all 
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cases of apparent third-party forgiveness to secondary or tertiary victims’ 
forgiveness in her doctoral dissertation. See K J Norlock, ‘A Feminist Ethic 
of Forgiveness,’ Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison, 2001. Claudia Card notes that in many cases where we 
might want to dismiss third-party forgiveness, “the facts are not so simple,” 
and Eve Garrard briefly mentions the possibility of third-party forgiveness in 
her discussion of forgiveness and the Holocaust. C Card, The Atrocity 
Paradigm: A Theory of Evil, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 186; 
E Garrard, ‘Forgiveness and the Holocaust,’ in Moral Philosophy and the 
Holocaust, E. Garrard and G. Scarre (eds.), Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 
2002, p. 149. Finally, Charles Griswold allows for third-party forgiveness as 
a form of imperfect forgiveness, provided the third-party is able to provide a 
credible narrative in which the victim would herself have forgiven under 
different circumstances, C L Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical 
Exploration, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 
7 John Gingell is an exception, as he argues that third-party forgiveness is 
logically incoherent, J Gingell, ‘Forgiveness and Power,’ Analysis, vol. 34, 
1974, pp. 180-83. 
8 I do not have space here to consider in detail a version of the victim’s 
prerogative that sits between the two: it could be called the ‘psychological’ 
version of the victims-only argument: only victims can forgive, because only 
victims can have the requisite self-pertaining emotional states (e.g.,  
resentment). I do not believe forgiveness necessarily entails deep emotional 
change; certain instances of forgiveness may be primarily performative or 
ritualistic, for example, or may focus more on changes in how I see the 
wrongdoer (and behave towards her) than changes in how I feel about her. 
Moreover, insofar as forgiveness does frequently involve a shift in angry 
feelings, there is something question-begging in predicating it - by definition 
- on a version of anger that is only self-pertaining, then concluding that we 
can only forgive injuries to ourselves. It seems to me that the burden of proof 
then rests with the advocate of the victim’s prerogative, who must defend 
why only resentment - and not indignation, condemnation, or blame, for 
example - is relevant. As Card notes, “one need not be a victim in order to 
blame or condemn.” Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil, p. 184. 
Those who argue resentment is necessary for forgiveness include Murphy 
and Hampton; H McGary, ‘Forgiveness,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 
vol. 26, no. 4, 1989, pp. 343-51; M Holmgren, ‘Forgiveness and the Intrinsic 
Value of Persons,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 4, 1993, 
pp. 341-52; Lang; R C Roberts, ‘Forgivingness,’ American Philosophical 
Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4, 1995, pp. 289-303; T Govier, Forgiveness and 
Revenge, Routledge, New York, 2002; P Hieronymi, ‘Articulating an 
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Uncompromising Forgiveness,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
vol. 62, no. 3, 2001, pp. 529-55. 
9 For a detailed discussion of moral deference - though not in relation to 
forgiveness, see L Thomas, ‘Moral Deference,’ Philosophical Forum, vol. 
14, nos. 1-3 1992, pp. 233-50. 
10 M Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence, Beacon Press, Boston, 1998, p. 8. 
11 This would be the case if third party forgiveness were always necessarily a 
substitute or a replacement for the victim’s forgiveness; that is, if forgiveness 
were an act that could only take place once. But since forgiveness is a 
personal reaction to wrongdoing, there is no reason why several persons 
cannot take it upon themselves to forgive - as would be uncontroversially the 
case if there were several victims of the wrong. 
12 Harvey, p. 30.  
13 Card cites studies by Roy F. Baumeister in describing discrepancies 
between perceptions of our harms done to others and their harms done to us. 
Baumeister notes that victims and perpetrators are equally likely to distort the 
facts of a wrongdoing, and to an equal degree, although victims will make the 
offense seem worse than it was, and perpetrators will distort facts to lessen it. 
R F Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Cruelty and Violence, Freeman, New 
York, 1997, pp. 18-19 quoted in Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of 
Evil, p. 9.  
14 Sophia Wong has drawn my attention to the role of third-party forgiveness 
in negotiating relationships between individuals with Alzheimers or 
dementia, their families and their caregivers. 
15 Griswold cites this peculiar consequence as his motivation for ‘softening’ 
the force of the hard-line position against third-party forgiveness and 
recognizing it as legitimate, albeit imperfectly so. 
16 See, for a discussion of ‘moral powers’, Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A 
Theory of Evil, p. 184. 
17 Thomas, pp. 233-50. 
18 Consider, for example, the ‘victim’ of a battered spouse who fights back. 
19 S Lamb, ‘Forgiveness, Women and Responsibility to the Group,’ Journal 
of Human Rights, vol. 5, 2006, p. 45. 
20 Griswold, p.118.  
21 For more detailed discussion of fragmented and relational identities, please 
see Norlock, “Why Self-Forgiveness needs Third-Party Forgiveness,” in this 
collection. 
22 Robin Schott makes this point, in responding to Card’s discussion of 
forgiveness: R M Schott, ‘The Atrocity Paradigm and the Concept of 
Forgiveness,’ Hypatia, vol. 19, no. 4, 2004, pp. 202-09. Card has responded 
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that she did not intend her paradigm to represent ‘ideal’ forgiveness, only a 
conceptually unproblematic example: C Card, ‘The Atrocity Paradigm 
Revisited,’ Hypatia, vol. 19, no. 4, 2004, pp. 212-19. The danger of distortion 
remains, however, in relying on such examples. Moreover, Griswold does 
refer to his chosen paradigm as “forgiveness at its best,” see Griswold, pp. 
38-53. 
23 See Norlock, pp. 128-63.  
24 See Norlock, in this collection. 
25 I can be extremely close to someone while having no idea of her 
experience in this matter and, equally, I can be right in my assessment that 
Pol Pot is unforgivable without therefore being the appropriate person to 
refuse his forgiveness. 
26 Griswold, p. 119.  
27 Harvey, p. 30. 
28 This does not guarantee that all third party acts of forgiveness, grounded in 
this particular way, are therefore morally correct, all things considered, any 
more than all acts of victim’s forgiveness are correct. 
29 Lamb, op. cit.  
30 This is particularly so when the third party in question wields institutional 
authority (for example, as part of a truth and reconciliation commission, or 
another amnesty-granting political body). I have focused on personal 
responses to wrongdoing in this paper precisely because the moral nuances of 
forgiveness are multiplied once institutional authority and representative 
agency enters the situation. 
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